Supreme Court of India | Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 | 2026 INSC 983 | Decided: 10.09.2026
Bench: Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. and Shree Chandrashekhar, J.
FACTS
The dispute concerned agricultural land measuring 4 Kanals 18 Marlas in the revenue estate of Muktsar, Punjab, tracing back to a civil suit instituted in 1981. The plaintiffs claimed ownership under a registered sale deed dated 13.05.1965 executed by Gajjan Singh and Baggu Singh, asserting that possession had been delivered simultaneously with execution, though revenue records continued to show one Attar Singh, Chela of Dera Bhai Mastan Singh, as the recorded possessor. The defendants, representing the Dera, resisted the suit, contending that the property had long ago been dedicated for Dharam-Arth (religious and charitable purposes), that Attar Singh held possession as “gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth” (rent-free religious possession) on the Dera’s behalf, and that upon his death possession had continued uninterrupted through successive Mahants — Kishan Singh, Santa Singh, and Bhag Singh. The defendants also disputed the sale deed’s validity on the ground that the vendors together owned only a half-share, the remainder belonging to one Pritam Singh.
ISSUE
Whether the High Court, exercising second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, was justified in reversing the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court — and whether the revenue entries describing possession as “gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth” were sufficient, in law, to establish a completed dedication or title by adverse possession in favour of the Dera.
MAIN ARGUMENTS
The appellants (Dera’s representatives) argued that the concurrent findings of the two courts below were pure findings of fact immune from second-appeal interference, that the unbroken chain of revenue entries conclusively proved dedication, and that in any event decades of uninterrupted possession through successive Mahants had ripened into title by adverse possession. They further urged that the sale deed could not convey title to the entire property since the vendors held only a half-share.
The respondents (plaintiffs) countered that revenue entries are evidence of possession alone and can never substitute for proof of title; that the plea of dedication and the plea of adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and cannot both stand; and that adverse possession requires specific pleading and proof of the date and manner in which possession turned hostile — which was wholly absent. They further submitted that the High Court had not reappreciated evidence but had corrected an erroneous application of settled legal principles, justifying interference under Section 100 CPC.
DECISION
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court’s judgment decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. The Court held that revenue entries such as Jamabandis and Khasra Girdawaris are relevant only to prove possession and can never, by themselves, be treated as conclusive proof of ownership or dedication. A valid dedication requires clear and unequivocal proof of intent to permanently divest ownership — mere long cultivation under a “Dharam-Arth” entry does not suffice.
The Court further held that dedication and adverse possession are legally inconsistent alternative pleas, and that the appellants’ possession, being traceable to a permissive/religious origin, could not simultaneously be hostile in character. In the absence of pleadings identifying when and how possession turned adverse, the plea of adverse possession failed on settled principles (T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa). While the sale deed could not convey title beyond what the vendors were competent to transfer (the vendors owning only a half-share), this weakness in the plaintiffs’ title did not, by itself, vest ownership in the defendants — each party must succeed on the strength of its own title.
The Court held that the High Court’s interference under Section 100 CPC was justified since the concurrent findings below were vitiated by an erroneous application of law rather than a mere alternate appreciation of evidence.
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